Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 33

Issue 2

Article 7

1945

Proximate Cause--Contributory Negligence--The Last Clear
Chance Doctrine--Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Poe
Anne F. Noyes
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Noyes, Anne F. (1945) "Proximate Cause--Contributory Negligence--The Last Clear Chance Doctrine-Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Poe," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 33: Iss. 2, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol33/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
This system avoids the material changes in road location which are
frequently necessary in Kentucky. Often by these relocations of
roads, land is left without any practical access to a highway. Therefore, we need a liberal interpretation of the statutes and Constitution
in order to obtain reasonable results based on present needs. The
problem will become more acute in the future, and it is necessary
that our courts apply and interpret the law in the manner consistent
with the growth and expansion of our Commonwealth as a whole.

A. E. FUNK, JR.

PROXIMATE CAUSE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-TlFIE
LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE-CHESAPEAKE
AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY v. POE
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reached a somewhat startling
conclusion in the recent case of Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. Pope.1 In this case, one Homer Ross Pope sought to recover
damages for the loss of a leg suffered when he was hit by a train of
the defendant railway while attempting to cross in front of it. Plaintiff had been talking to a friend near the tracks and was aware of the
fact that the train was coming. He decided to cross in front of it although he knew that he was giving himself a margin of only a few
seconds, and that he would have to run in order to escape injury.
Pope, a mail carrier, had crossed the track many times before the
accident, and would have made it safely across on the occasion in
question if his foot had not caught in a hole negligently left there by
to 4 inches in length, was
the defendant company. This hole, 3
about 6 inches deep and situated next to the inside of the outer rail
on the eastbound track. There was evidence to the effect that if
Pope had had a few more seconds he could easily have stood up and
freed his foot, but the train was so close that perhaps the better
alternative was for him to move his body out of the way and not
run the risk of it being crushed when he attempted to arise. He
based his recovery upon the statutory negligence of the defendant
company in allowing the hole in the right-of-way to remain unrepaired 2
Defendant traversed the plaintiff's allegations and pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. This negligence
'296 Ky. 254, 176 S. W. (2d) 876 (1943).
2KRS 277.060(2) provides that "every railroad company
shall restore to its former condition, as near as may be, any . . .
highway, street . . . upon which it has constructed its road, and
shall maintain the same in that condition within the right of way
of the railroad company. It shall construct suitable road and street
crossings for the passage of traffic by putting down planks or
other suitable material between and on each side of the rails, the
top of which shall be at least as high as the top of the rails."
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consisted in attempting to cross in front of the rapidly oncoming
train, of whose approach he was aware. Evidence showed that the
engineer stopped his train as soon as possible after discovering that
Pope was caught upon the track. Judgment was given in favor of
the plaintiff, the decision resting upon the theory that but for the
negligence of the defendant the accident would not have occurred;
further, that this negligence "supervened" thus cutting off the prior
negligence of the plaintiff, so that his negligence thus became only
the remote cause of the accident and did not bar his recovery. The
dissenting opinion by one judge, in which a second judge concurred, is particularly enlightening. It expresses the opinion that
Pope was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and that his negligence in attempting to cross in front of a fast
moving train could not have exhausted itself in the space of a few
seconds, which was the time that Pope was held before he was hit
by the train.
Several problems are raised by this decision. Among them is
the distinction between proximate and remote cause and the matter of liability arising from this distinction. We are required to
analyse the nature of a supervening act and must also consider
whether the plaintiff's conduct was a substantial factor in causing
the injury. Mentioned in the opinion, but not discussed, is the doctrine of the last clear chance. It would, perhaps, have been
appropriate if the Court had compared our American doctrine with
that of the English in view of the result that the Court reached.
One of the first elements to be brought out in a discussion o,
this case is the fact that the sine qua non, or "but for," rule can
be applied just as reasonably to the plaintiff's as to the defendant's
act. The Court holds that but for the negligence of the railway
company in allowing the hole to remain unrepaired, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. This statement is true, but it is also
misleading, for it can as soundly be stated that but for the negligence of the plaintiff in crossing in front of the train he would not
have been injured. Both negligent acts were substantial factors in
causing the accident. In similar cases, where the plaintiff's negligence has been a causal factor in his injury, the Kentucky Court
has usually not allowed recovery,, nor have other jurisdictions in
like circumstances.'
-Pearless Mfg. Corp. v. Davenport, 281 Ky. 654, 136 S. W. (2d)
779 (1940) (defendant negligent in construction of platform but
injury would not have happened but for negligence of plaintiff);
Gaines' Adm'x. v. City of Bowling Green, 235 Ky. 800, 32 S. W. (2d)
348 (1930) (city negligent in not putting lights on ditch, but for
plaintiff's negligent act injury would not have occurred); Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Napier, 223 Ky. 417, 3 S. W. (2d)
1070 (1928) (defendant negligent in maintenance of equipment, but
injury would not have occurred but for plaintiff's negligence);
Griffin v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 169 Ky. 522, 184 S. W. 888
(1916) (defendant negligent in blocking crossing, but injury would
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The question in this case is whether the plaintiff's negligence
was superseded by the defendant's negligence. An intervening force is defined in The Restatement of Torts as "one which
actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's
negligent act or omission has been committed."' In the present case,
the Court held that the negligence of the defendant was the supervening force which took effect after the negligence of the plaintiff.
This is a difficult point to understand, for the negligence of the defendant was a continuing factor, one that was always present, as
opposed to one that could have occurred only after the plaintiff's
negligent act. In order for the defendant to do a negligent act that
would supersede that of the plaintiff it would have to follow after
the act of the plaintiff. An example of such an act would occur if
an engineer should negligently fail to apply the brakes of a train
immediately upon his discovery that a person would be unable to
get off of the tracks before the engine reached the spot where that
person might be caught. In the principal case it would be difficult
to say that the negligence of the defendant supervened in the space
of a few seconds and cut off entirely all of the prior negligence of
the plaintiff. If any act intervened and contributed to the cause of
the accident it was the plaintiff's own act as it was later in point
of time. The negligence of the defendant was always present and
was not something new that grew up suddenly following the act
of the plaintiff.
In view of the facts of the case it is difficult to hold that the
plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. His
act fits the definition of contributory negligence given in The Restatement of Torts, as it was "conduct on . . . (his) part which

(fell) below the standard to which he should (have conformed) for
his own protection and (it was) a legally contributing cause, cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about
plaintiff's harm."' in earlier Kentucky cases,7 and in decisions from
not have occurred but for plaintiff's act); Louisville and Nashville
R. R. Co. v. Keiffer, 132 Ky. 419, 113 S. W. 433 (1908) (defendant
negligent in not properly warning plaintiff of danger, but injury
would not have occurred but for negligence of plaintiff).
'Murphy v. Shibiya, 125 Neb. 487, 250 N. W. 746 (1933) (defendant negligent in manner in which he parked his car, but injury
would not have occurred but for negligence of plaintiff in not
warning husband of danger); Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W.
Va. 100, 196 S. E. 563 (1938) (defendant negligent in upkeep of
premises, but death would not have resulted but for plaintiff's
failure to acquire proper medical attention); Rusczck v. Chicago
and N. W. Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 130, 210 N. W. 361 (1926) (defendant negligent in not giving proper warning, but death would not
have occurred but for plaintiff's negligence in attempting to cross
tracks of whose condition he was aware).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) sec. 441(1).
6
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) sec. 463.
'Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co. v. Lefever's Adm'x., 288
Ky. 195, 155 S. W. (2d) 845 (1941) (where plaintiff crossed in front
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other states,' a plaintiff has been automatically barred from recovery on the basis of contributory negligence when he has attempted to cross in front of a train which he knew was approaching.'
The common law did not allow recovery by a plaintiff who had
been contributorily negligent, but since this has often worked an
injustice some states have passed statutes permitting the courts to
mitigate the damages according to the comparative degree of negligence of the parties. Courts generally disliking the strict rule of contributory negligence, have also sought to avoid its results by the
doctrine of the last clear chance whenever it is applicable. By this
doctrine a plaintiff may recover, if his negligence preceded that of
the defendant, and if the defendant knowing of the plaintiff's negligence is the last one who may avoid the accident. This will be effective, however, only if the defendant knows or should, by the
exercise of reasonable care, know of the peril of the helpless or
non-perceiving plaintiff and has an opportunity to avoid it after
acquiring knowledge of the situation." Unless it can be proved
that the defendant could have avoided the injury but for his later
negligence, the negligence of the plaintiff will be a defense against
his liability."
of train he knew was approaching); Louisville and Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Mitchell's Adm'x., 276 Ky. 671, 124 S. W. (2d) 1025 (1939)
(where plaintiff crossed in front of train known to be approaching); Franklin v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co., 267 Ky. 577,
102 S. W. (2d) 1010 (1937) (where plaintiff crossed while signal
lights were flashing); Barrett's Adm'r. v. Louisville and Nashville
R. R. Co., 206 Ky. 662, 268 S. W. 283 (1924) (where plaintiff crossed
in front of train he knew was approaching).
'Conrad v. Wheelock et al, 24 F. (2d) 996 (S. D. Il. 1928);
Bunton v. Atchison T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 100 Kan. 165, 163 Pac. 801
(1917); Akerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 158 Minn. 369, 197 N.
W. 842 (1924); Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Jones et al, 166 Okla.
291, 27 P. (2d) 593 (1933); Feudale v. Hines, 271 Pa. 199, 114 AtI.
497 (1921).
'Compare Samkiwicz v. Atlantic City R. R. Co., 82 N. J. L. 478,
81 Atl. 833 (1911) (which holds that running in front of an oncoming train when lights are flashing does not necessarily constitute contributory negligence) with cases cited supra note 8.
"Clere's Adm'r. v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 253 Ky. 700,
70 S. W. (2d) 16 (1934) (where engineer with proper lookout could
have seen at 400 feet the stalled automobile on tracks); Pollard
v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 92 Mont. 119, 11 P. (2d) 271 (1932)
(where engineer saw stalled truck on tracks at distance of 500
Mo.178 S. W.
feet but did not stop); Adams v. Thompson, (2d) 779 (1944); Clark v. Boston and Maine R. R. Co., 87 N. H. 434,
182 Atl. 175 (1935) (when train was 192 feet from plaintiff, who
was standing upon the tracks, question of last clear chance sent
to jury, since defendant could have stopped in 100 feet).
"Ellerman v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 7 Cal. App. (2d) 385, 47
P. (2d) 521 (1935) (defendant not liable since he applied brakes
as soon as he realized plaintiff's peril); Landers v. Erie R. R. Co.,
244 Fed. 72 (C. C. A. 6, 1917) (where defendant could not have
avoided injury since interval of time between catching of plain-
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In contrast to this rule in the United States is the English rule
as exemplified by the decision in British Columbia Electric Railway
Company v Loach." In that case the decedent while riding in a
wagon was killed by the defendant's train. He was negligent in
crossing in front of the train without looking in either direction or
stopping. Due to the prior negligence of the defendant in starting
out with defective brakes and due to his excessive speed, the train
could not be stopped soon enough to avoid hitting the wagon. The
jury found that had the brakes been good the engineer could
have stopped between the time when he discovered the wagon on
the tracks and the time that it took the train to reach the wagon.
The court decided in favor of the plaintiff, holding that it was the
defendant's negligence in taking the train out of the barn in the
morning with defective brakes that caused the injury, and that
therefore the plaintiff's negligence had no effect upon the accident
as the defendant could not have stopped under the circumstances.
The effect of this rule is that while the original negligence of the
defendant prevents him from having the last clear chance, this
resting in the plaintiff, he is still held liable for an act which may
or may not be foreseeable, but over which he does not have any
control at the time that it occurs.
This rule has been repudiated in Kentucky by the case of
Braden's Administratrix v. Liston." In that case the plaintiff's decedent negligently stepped into the street and was hit by the defendant, who was driving a car with defective brakes. The Court
held that the defendant was required to use only ordinary care
with the means he then had available to avoid hitting the decedent,
and gave judgment for the defendant. While these two cases are
certainly parallel they reach different results, and, assuming that
the American doctrine of the last clear chance is correct, it can be
said that the decision in the second case is the sounder of the two.
The English and Kentucky cases are parallel to the case under
discussion. The negligence of the defendant in allowing the hole
to remain in the right-of-way corresponds to the negligence of the
defendants abo'e in having defective brakes. In all three cases the
plaintiff negligently stepped in front of the oncoming vehicle and
was injured even though the respective defendants did the best
that they could do under the circumstances to avoid the accident.
In all cases the defendant's negligence was a continuing one that
would not have caused the injury had it not been for the later
negligence of the plaintiffs. The American doctrine of last clear
chance means literally the last and clear chance. In none of these
tiff's foot upon track and the collision was too short); Thing v.
Southern Pacific Co., 31 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 9, 1929) (where defendant warned plaintiff of his oncoming railroad motor car and
applied brakes as soon as possible).
" 1 A. C. 719 (1916).
" 258 Ky. 44, 79 S. W. (2d) 241 (1934).
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three cases did the defendant have the last clear chance, yet in the
English case and in the Pope case the courts decided in favor of the
plaintiffs.
In view of the great weight of authority in the United States
it would seem that this decision is incorrect. The accident would
not have ocurred but for the negligence of the plaintiff, which
was, therefore, a substantial factor in producing the injury. Since
he knew of the approach of the train and of the few seconds that
he was allowing himself, it would appear that he did not act as
a reasonable man under the circumstances. On the other hand, the
negligence of the defendant was a continuing act, and as he did not
have the last clear chance, but did all that it was possible for him
to do under the circumstances, he should not be held liable.
ANNE F.

NOYES

